This is the sixth and final section on Turretin’s discussion of Middle Knowledge. This section delves into the philosophical arguments that undermine the concept of middle knowledge, demonstrating that the concept of middle knowledge leads to inevitable self-contradictions.
1. Two categories of knowledge are all that are required, because all true objects of knowledge are things possible or things actual (in Turretin’s terms, “future”).
2. Untrue things cannot be foreseen as true. In other words, unless it is true that a man will do “X” in situation “Y”, God cannot foresee such a thing as true.
3. If divine providence is comprehensive (if it extends to men’s acts) then men’s will cannot be said to be indeterminate.
4. God’s knowledge cannot be said to be uncertain. Therefore, if God foresees “X” as certain, then it cannot be said to be uncertain.
5. Middle Knowledge removes God’s sovereignty over the creature, because it suggests that God is in essence depending on man’s fortuitous cooperation in obtaining the ends he wishes.
6. Middle Knowledge removes God’s freedom to base decisions solely on his own good pleasure, thereby contradicting the view of God presented in Romans 9.